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Abstract:  This paper compares two different models in a common environment.  The
first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot
sell short.  The second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so
much that they would want to default, but is otherwise a standard complete markets
model.  Both models share the features that individuals are unable to completely insure
against idiosyncratic shocks and that interest rates are lower than subjective discount
rates.  In a stochastic environment, the two models have quite different dynamic
properties, with the debt constrained model exhibiting simple stochastic steady states,
while the liquidity constrained model has greater persistence of shocks.
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1. Introduction
There is considerable empirical evidence that both individual consumers and larger
entities such as countries bear more idiosyncratic risk than is consistent with complete
and frictionless Arrow-Debreu markets.   Evidence at the level of the individual consumer
is discussed, for example, in Hayashi [1985] and Zeldes [1989], who show that individual
consumption is poorly correlated with aggregate consumption.  Evidence at the
international level is discussed, for example, in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [1992], who
point out the low correlation between consumption levels across countries.
That individuals bear idiosyncratic risk can be captured by many departures from
the Arrow-Debreu framework.  Three important examples of such models are incomplete
market models, where there are not enough securities to insure against all events; models
of liquidity constraints in which individual consumers are assumed unable to borrow as
much as they would like in loan markets; and models of adverse selection and moral
hazard.  Incomplete market models are discussed by Radner [1972], Hart [1975], and
Duffie and Shafer [1985], for example.  Examples of models of liquidity constraints can
be found in Bewley [1980], Dumas [1980], Townsend [1980], Scheinkman and Weiss
[1986], Abel [1990], Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford [1992] and Heaton and Lucas [1997].
Models of liquidity constraints typically involve incomplete markets, as not only are there
short sales constraints on securities, but securities are limited in number as well. These
papers have largely focused on the computation of special types of equilibria in
economies where the outside asset is a fiat money of no intrinsic value. In these equilibria
shocks have long term consequences.  We show that this is also the case in the
incomplete market model considered in this paper.
Models of adverse selection and moral hazard, with the notable exception of
Prescott and Townsend [1984], are not ordinarily general equilibrium models, so fall
outside the scope of this paper, but the interested reader should consult Green [1987] who
shows some of the links between asset market models and models of adverse selection.
Models with incomplete markets and/or liquidity constraints typically have the
properties that in equilibrium individuals bear idiosyncratic risk, and interest rates are
lower than subjective discount rates.  There is also a fourth model that shares these
properties: a model with individually rational debt constraints.  Here the setup differs2
from that of Arrow-Debreu only in the assumption that a portion of the endowment is
inalienable and cannot be seized if a consumer goes bankrupt.  This model has been
studied by Schechtman and Escurdero [1977], Manuelli [1986], and Kehoe and Levine
[1993]. It has been applied to the study of existing asset markets by Alvarez and Jermann
[1997], Kehoe and Perri [1998], and Krueger and Perri [1998]. It is worth noting that
there are two distinct models of debt constraints: those in which traders can be excluded
from spot markets, or those, as in Kehoe and Levine [1993] where they cannot. The latter
possibility leads to a failure of the welfare theorems, and is conceptually more like the
incomplete market model. In the single good model studied here, and widely used in
finance, including the papers cited above, however, there is no spot market, and as a
result the welfare theorems hold.
This paper directly compares the debt constrained model to the incomplete
markets/liquidity constrained model in the same physical environment in which
consumers alternate either deterministically or randomly between having high and low
endowments.  The basic point is that the debt constrained model, largely because it
involves a much smaller departure from the Arrow-Debreu framework, leads to a vastly
simpler and more tractable model of equilibrium in the stochastic case, but nevertheless
incorporates the main features of equilibrium idiosyncratic risk bearing and interest rates
lower than subject discount rates.
2.  The Environment
There are an infinite number of discrete time periods t = 01 ,, K.   In each period
there are two types of consumers i =12 , , and a continuum of each type of consumer.
There is a single consumption good x; the representative consumer of type i consumes  xt
i
in period t.  The infinite vector of consumption is (, ) xx
ii
01 Kl Î ¥
++, where l¥
++ is the set of
sequences that are bounded and positive.  Both consumers have the common stationary




t (, )( ) () 01 0 1 K =-
=
¥ å dd.  The period utility function
is twice continuously differentiable withDu x () > 0, satisfies the boundary condition
Du x () ®¥ as x ® 0, and hasDux
2 0 () < .  The common discount factor d  satisfies
01 << d .
There are two types of capital: human capital (or labor) and physical capital (trees
or land).  The services of the (one unit of) human capital held by type i consumer in3
period t are denoted wt




bg < , corresponding to bad and good productivity respectively.  Moreover, if one
consumer has good productivity, then the other consumer has bad productivity, so if
wt
ib =w  then wt
ig - =w  (where -i is the type of consumer who is not type i).  We start by
assuming that productivity alternates between good and bad, so if wt
ig =w  then
wt
ib
+ = 1 w .  Subsequently, we will allow for a more general process of randomly
switching between the two productivity pairs ( , ) ( , ) ww tt
gb 12 = ww and
(, )(, ) ww tt
bg 12 = ww .
There is one unit of physical capital in the economy.  This capital is durable and
returns r > 0 of the consumption good in every period.  If r = 0, physical capital would
be interpreted as fiat money, but we do not allow this case.  Since r > 0 we may interpret
physical capital as trees, with r being the amount of consumption good produced every
period by the trees.  A consumer of type i holds a share qt
i  of the capital stock at the
beginning of time t.  Initial physical capital holdings are q0
i .
The total supply of the consumption good in this economy is the sum of the
individuals’ productivity, plus the return on the single unit of physical capital
w w
gb r ++ .  We denote this aggregate supply as w .  The social feasibility conditions for
this economy in each period are
xx r tt
gb 12 +£ ++ = ww w
qq tt
12 1 +£ .
3. Market  Arrangements
In this physical environment, we consider two different models of intertemporal
trade.  In the liquidity constrained economy consumers can only carry out intertemporal
trade by exchanging real capital.  The consumption good is taken to be numeraire, and the
price of physical capital in period t is denoted by vt .  The objective of a consumer of type
i is to solve the problem


































The crucial feature of this model is that physical capital can be held only in
nonnegative amounts, and that there are no securities or other assets that can be traded
besides physical capital.  To understand this better, it is useful to think of trade as taking
place at different physical locations around the circle, as shown in Figure 1.  Only
consumers at the same location can trade; the measure of both types of consumers is the
same.  The type 1 consumers do not move, and type 2 consumers move counter-
clockwise.  The essential feature is that type 2 consumers move in such a fashion, say a
single radian each period, that they never return to the same location.  In this model,
intertemporal trade can be carried on only by exchanging physical capital, and physical
capital can not be held in negative quantities, so this explains both why there is only one
security, and why it cannot be sold short.  Later in the paper, we discuss the consequences







In the liquidity constrained economy, an equilibrium is an infinite sequence of
consumption levels, capital holdings, and capital prices such that consumers maximize
utility given their constraints, and such that the social feasibility conditions are satisfied.
The second model of intertemporal trade that we examine is the debt constrained
economy.  Here we allow borrowing and lending and, in the stochastic case that we
discuss later, the sale and purchase of insurance contracts.  There are, however, debt
constraints.  These come about because consumers have the option of going bankrupt, or5
otherwise opting out of intertemporal trade.  If they choose to do this, they renege on all
existing debts.  They are excluded from all further participation in intertemporal trade,
however, and their physical capital is seized.  The endowment of human capital is
assumed to be inalienable: it cannot be taken away, nor can consumers be prevented from
consuming its returns.  Notice that unlike the model of trading physical capital, which can
be completely decentralized, this model requires a credit agency, a government, or some
central authority to keep track of who has gone bankrupt and to assure that their capital is
seized and that they do not continue to borrow and lend.
Formally, this is a model in which consumers face the individual rationality
constraint













t ux uw .
This says that in every period, the value of continuing to participate in the economy is no
less than the value of dropping out.  In this setting, the absence of private information
implies that no consumer actually goes bankrupt in equilibrium: the credit agency will
never lend so much to consumers that they will choose bankruptcy.  This is very unlike
the incomplete markets bankruptcy models of Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik  [1988]
and Zame [1993].
In this debt constrained economy, since markets are complete, consumers
purchase consumption in period t for pt and they sell the return on their capital wr t
ii + q0
at the same price.  The corresponding optimization problem is

















00 0 () q













t ux uw t K
Notice that we have written the budget constraint in the Arrow-Debreu form.  As is usual
in this sort of model, and as we show formally in appendix, we can equally well


























The constraint q t
i ³- Q rules out Ponzi schemes, but unlike the liquidity constrained
economy where Q=0, here Q is a positive constant chosen large enough not to constrain
to borrowing.
An  equilibrium  of the debt constrained economy is an infinite sequence of
consumption levels and consumption prices such that consumers maximize utility given
their constraints and such that the social feasibility condition for consumption is satisfied.
We start by examining symmetric steady states of both the liquidity and the debt




















gb += w , we can characterize consumption at a symmetric steady state by the
single number x
g .  As is usual in steady state analysis, to implement the steady state as
an equilibrium, we must create a transfer payment between the consumers so that they
satisfy their budget constraints. Later we extend the analysis of the debt constrained
economy to more general dynamic equilibria.
4.  Comparison of Liquidity and Debt Constrained Markets
We can now compare the steady state equilibria of the liquidity and debt
constrained economies.  Throughout the analysis we use first order Euler conditions to
characterize the optimum of the consumer. It is well known that, together with a
transversality condition, the Euler conditions are necessary and sufficient for a path to be
an optimum. See Scheinkman [1976] and Araujo and Scheinkman [1977]. These same
papers show that the transversality condition is satisfied if the path is bounded. In our
analysis, the paths we study all converge to (or even begin at) a steady state, so they are
bounded. As a result we focus our analysis on the first order conditions.
We begin by characterizing equilibria in the liquidity constrained economy. In this
economy, x
g  is determined by the fact that the consumer with good productivity is free to
purchase as much physical capital as he wishes from the consumer with bad productivity.
His marginal utility in the current period is  Du x
g ( ), while next period he will have bad7
productivity, and marginal utility Du x Du x
bg () ( ) =- w .  Consequently, the first order















In the appendix we show that any equilibrium prices vv 01 , K satisfying these equations
must be bounded as well.  Simple algebraic manipulation then implies that, if  vt  0  for
all t, then vv t =  for all t.
The three conditions that must be satisfied are the budget constraints in the good
and bad state, and the first order condition in the good state
xv v r
xv v r












() ( ) ( ) .
Multiplying the first equation by Du x
g ()  and the second by d w Du x
g () - , we use
q q
gb += 1 and  xx
gb += w  to find
Du x x Du x x
Du x v Du x v r
Du x v r Du x v r
g gg g ggb
gg
gb gb
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
( ) () ( ) () .
-+ - - -=
-+ - +
++ - - +
wd w w w
dw
qdw q 22
Substituting the first order for the good state into the right hand side of this equation, we
obtain
Du x x Du x x
Du x Du x r
g gg g ggb
gg b
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) .
-+ - - -=
+-
wdw w w
dw q 2 7
It is convenient to define
f x Du x x Du x x
Lg g g g g g b () () ( ) ( ) ( ) =- + - - - w d w w w .
There are two possibilities: either q
b > 0 at x
g =w / 2 or q
b = 0 for x
gg Î[/ , ] w w 2 . In
the latter case, we have  fx
Lg () = 0 . In the former case,  f
L(/ ) w 20  .
We have demonstrated the following result.
Proposition 1: A symmetric steady state x
g  of the liquidity constrained economy is
characterized by
f
L(/ ) w 20   and x
g = w /2 or8
w w
g > /2,  fx
Lg () = 0  and x
gg Î[/ , ] ww 2 .
We turn next to the debt constrained economy.  We define the consumption set for
each individual to be the set of nonnegative consumption plans that are individually
rational.  Given this definition, the model is a standard complete markets model with a
finite number of consumer types.  The standard argument implies that the equilibrium is
Pareto efficient: Suppose, to the contrary that there exists an alternative allocation that is
feasible, satisfies the individual rationality constraints, yields at least as much utility to
both consumers, and yields strictly more utility to at least one consumer. Then this
alternative allocation must assign to the consumer that is strictly better off a consumption
bundle that costs strictly more than his endowment at the equilibrium prices,








00 0 ~ () q .
Furthermore, it must assign the other consumer a consumption bundle that costs at least
as much as his endowment because, if it assigns a consumption bundle that costs strictly
less, the consumer could spend the extra income, make himself better off, and not violate
his individual rationality constraint,
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Together, these two conditions imply that the alternative allocation costs more than the
aggregate endowment.
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As in the model without debt constraints, this implies that the alternative allocation
cannot be feasible, which contradicts the assumption that there is a Pareto superior
allocation.
Proposition 2: An equilibrium allocation in the debt constrained economy is Pareto
efficient.
In a symmetric steady state, the first best is to equalize consumption between the
two consumers, x
g = w /2.  It may be impossible to reach this allocation without9
violating the individual rationality constraint, however.  To achieve a Pareto improvement
over autarky using a stationary allocation, consumption must be transferred from the
consumer with good productivity to the consumer with bad productivity. Eventually, the
individual rationality constraint for the consumer with good productivity may be violated:
the consumer with good productivity would prefer to declare bankruptcy rather than to
make the transfer.  We conclude that, if consumption between the two consumers is not
equalized, then the individual rationality constraint for the consumer with good
productivity must bind exactly.  The utility that the consumer with good productivity
receives in equilibrium is proportional to ux u x
gg () ( ) +- dw ; the utility he would have
received from his endowment is proportional to uu
gb () () wd w + .  If we define
fx u x u u x u
Dg g g g b () () () ( ) () =-+ - - wd w w 27 ,
then the exact binding of the individual rationality constraint can be written  fx
Dg () = 0.
We can summarize this discussion.
Proposition 3: A symmetric steady state x
g  of the debt constrained economy is
characterized by
f
D(/ ) w 20 ³  and x
g = w /2 or
w w
g > /2, f x
Dg () = 0 and x
gg Î[/ , ] ww 2 .
We can now compare steady states of the two models by studying the functions
ff
LD  and  : Concavity of the utility function implies that  f
D is concave.  Since  f
L
replaces the utility differences in  f
D with the slope of the utility function multiplied by
the difference between the two consumption levels  x
g  and xx
bg =- w , concavity of u
also implies that  fx fx
Dg Lg () () > .  Finally, r > 0 implies that
w w w w w =++ >+
gb gb r , and this means that  f
Lg () w > 0 .
Figure 2 shows what  ff
LD  and   look like in the case where  f
D(/ ) w 20 < .  From
this figure we can immediately see that steady states of both types exist: since each
function f  is continuous and positive at w
g , either it is positive at w /2, in which case
w /2 is a steady state, or it must be zero somewhere on the interval [ / , ] ww 2
g , and that
zero is a steady state.  Moreover, since  f
D is concave, it can be zero at most in this
interval, so that in the debt constrained economy the steady state is unique.  If we10
calculate  Df
L  and substitute in the interior steady state condition  fx
Lg () = 0 , we find
that at interior steady state  Df x
Lg () > 0 .  As can be seen in Figure 2, this together with
the boundary condition  f
Lg () w > 0  implies that in the liquidity constrained economy the










Proposition 4: A symmetric steady state exists both in the liquidity constrained and in the
debt constrained economy. In each case there is only one symmetric steady state.
In the limiting case where d =1 in the liquidity constrained economy, we can
calculate  fD u r
L(/ ) (/ ) ww 22 0 => .  For d  sufficiently close to 1,  f
L(/ ) w 20 > , and
so the only liquidity constrained symmetric steady state will be the symmetric first best
x
g = w /2.  Since  fx fx
Dg Lg () () >  the same statement is true in the debt constrained
economy case: in both cases we reach full efficiency when consumers are sufficiently
patient.
In a similar vein, we see that
sgn ( / ) sgn ( / ) ( / ) f
Lg b ww w d w w 22 2 =- + - .
Increasing r, holding w
g  and w
b fixed, has the effect of increasing w w w =++
gb r.
When r is sufficiently large, w w /2³
g and  f
L(/ ) w 20   again imply that both liquidity
constrained and debt constrained symmetric steady states are first best.  In other words, if11
the gross return to the stock of physical capital is sufficiently large relative to the
productivity of human capital, then markets are fully efficient.
The intuition for these results is simple: In the liquidity constrained economy
increasing d  increases the steady state price of physical capital v, thus increasing v r + .
Increasing r does this directly.  The larger is v r + , the easier it is for consumers to
smooth consumption using trades in physical capital.  In the debt constrained economy
increasing d  increases the penalty for bankruptcy that a consumer suffers from being
excluded from intertemporal trade.  Increasing r increases the penalty that he suffers from
losing his collateral, his endowment of physical capital.  The larger are these penalties,
the easier it is to satisfy the individual rationality constraints.










In the symmetric first best this gives the usual complete market interest rate equal to the
subjective discount rate 11 /d - .  When the symmetric first best is not reached, x x
gb > ,
so the interest rate will be lower than the subjective discount rate.  The intuition is simple:
Borrowers are constrained, lenders are not.  To keep the level of loans from lenders as
low as is required in equilibrium, the market must have a low rate of interest.
The general features of both the liquidity constrained and the debt constrained
economy can be illustrated by a simple numerical example.  Suppose that utility is given
by  ux x () l o g = , and that the endowments and discount factors are ww
gb == 24 9 ,,
r =1,   d =12 / .  Here the consumers are quite impatient, and their productivity fluctuates
substantially.  In addition, human capital is much more important than physical capital.
In the liquidity constrained economy we compute
fx x x x x
Lg g g g g ( ) () /() / () =- + - -= 24
1
2
25 34 0 ,
from which it follows that  xx
gb == 2063 1337 ., . .  By way of contrast, in the debt
constrained economy,
fx x x
Dg g g ( ) log log log( ) log =-+ - - = 24
1
2
34 9 0 27 ,12
resulting in  xx
gb == 18 16 , .  As can be seen, the liquidity constrained economy has
less consumption smoothing, and indeed, the debt constrained economy exhibits a large
degree of consumption smoothing.  As we shall see below, if the shock is more persistent,
the degree of consumption smoothing is significantly reduced.
It is also of interest to compute the interest rate.  The subjective discount rate
corresponding to a discount factor of 1/2 is 100 percent.  In the liquidity constrained
economy however, the interest rate is 29.6 percent, considerably lower.  In the debt
constrained economy it is 77.8 percent.
This example is also useful because it illustrates how the symmetric steady states
of the two models can be implemented as equilibria.  The problem that we must get
around is that discounting puts the two consumers in asymmetric positions: the type of
consumer who first has good productivity has a permanent advantage over the other type.
The easiest way to compensate for this advantage and arrive at the steady state is to
impose a transfer payment from one consumer type to the other.  In the liquidity
constrained model, we need the budget constraint for the consumer type who first has
high productivity, say type 1, to hold in the first period,
xv v r
gg +£ + + - wq t 0
1() .
This constraint holds with equality when vx
gg =- w  if tq =+ 0
1() vr .
In the debt constrained model, we need to transfer enough income so that the
present discounted value of lifetime incomes are equal
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Alternatively, in the debt constrained model, we could introduce uncertainty before the
first period, giving both consumer types equal chances of having the high productivity
first, and allowing them to write contingent contracts against this initial uncertainty.
5.  Short Sales
So far we have assumed that capital must be held in nonnegative amounts.  This is
an immediate consequence of the locational story given above.  In the deterministic case,
that there is only one asset, physical capital, means that only the inability to borrow
prevents asset markets from being complete.  In the next section, we consider a stochastic
economy.  In the stochastic case, that there is only one asset forces asset markets to be13
incomplete.  In the stochastic setting, the locational story plays a more significant role,
because it gives an economically sensible story of why asset markets are incomplete.
It is easy to work out what happens in the deterministic case when borrowing of
physical capital is allowed, even though such sales are not compatible with our locational
story.  We assume that the constraint on short sales of capital takes the form q t
i d ³- .
The only change in the previous analysis is that the consumer with bad productivity can
now spend up to 1+ d  units of physical capital to purchase w
gg x -  units of
consumption.  If we redefine
f x Du x x rd Du x x rd
Lg g g g g g b () () ( ) ( ) ( ) =- + + - - - + wd w w w ,
then the characterization of equilibrium in Proposition 3 continues to hold.
It is obvious that, if d is sufficiently large,  f
L(/ ) w 20 >  and the symmetric first
best is the unique symmetric steady state.   Since a single asset is all that is needed for
market completeness in the deterministic case, this should come as no surprise.  There is
also a unique level of debt  $ d  so that  fx
Lg ($ ) = 0 , where  $ x
g  is the unique solution of
fx
Dg ( $ ) = 0.  In the numerical example in the previous section, setting  $ . d =132 results in
a solution where  $ x
g =18 in the modified liquidity constrained model, just as in the debt
constrained model.
If our welfare criterion places equal weights on the two types utility and if the debt
limit dd > $  (and  $ / x
g <w 2), then the liquidity constrained equilibrium provides a higher
welfare level than the debt constrained equilibrium.  (If the discount factor is close
enough to one, higher welfare in this sense will also imply Pareto dominance.)  The
implication is that to enforce the repayment of debt in the incomplete markets model
when dd > $ , it will be necessary to seize human as well as physical capital.
6.  A Stochastic Environment
With deterministic alternation between productivities, the liquidity constrained
economy and debt constrained economy are quite similar: the major difference is that the
debt constraints allow greater trade.  We now show that when we allow for random
productivities, equilibrium with debt constraints continues to be described by a stochastic
version of a steady state, but the liquidity constrained economy does not permit this type
of simple equilibrium.14
We modify the physical environment so that the consumer with good productivity
is chosen randomly.  Let ht Î{, 2 } 1  denote the consumer who has good productivity at
time t.  This random variable is assumed to follow a Markov process, which is
characterized by a single number 01 << p , the probability of a reversal, that is, a
transition from the state where type 1 has good productivity to the state where type 2 has
good productivity, or vice versa.  When p =1 we are in the deterministic case.
The economy now takes place on a tree rather than over time.  The root of the tree
is denoted by h0.  A state history is a finite list s t = (,,) h h 1 K  of events that have taken
place through time ts () , where ts ()  is the length of the vector s, the time at which s
occurs.  The history immediately prior to s is denoted s-1, and if the node s  follows s
on the tree, we write s > s.  The countable set of all state histories is denoted S.  The
probability of a state history is computed from the Markov transition probabilities









Consumption and endowments are now subscripted by state history, rather than by
time.  Utility for consumer i is the expected utility ( ) ( )
() 1-




sS ux .  Define q s
i  to
be the holding of capital at the end of state s. The optimization problem in the liquidity
constrained case now becomes15
max ( ) ( )
() 1-





















, 0 0 fixed.
In the debt constrained economy the optimization problem of the consumer is
max ( ) ( )
() 1-































() ( / ) ( ) () ( / ) ( ) .
() ( ) () ( )
q







As in the deterministic case, a proposition appendix shows that this Arrow-Debreu
formulation of the budget constraint has an equivalent sequential markets formulation.
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qq Q  fixed,
where  q s (,) h  is the price of the Arrow security traded in state s that promises a unit of
physical capital to be delivered at state (, ) s h . A standard arbitrage argument implies that
qq v sss (,) (,) 12 += . The sequential markets budget constraint for debt constrained markets
differs from the liquidity constrained budget constraint in two ways. First, as in the
deterministic case, we have Q>0 rather than Q=0. Second, and significantly, in the





In the stochastic case, we define a symmetric stochastic steady state by
consumption  x
g  when productivity is good and x

















In the debt constrained economy, stochastic steady states are much like deterministic
steady states: we decrease x
g  from w
g  until we either achieve the symmetric first best at
x
g = w /2 or until the individual rationality constraint begins to bind.  As in the
deterministic case, we define a function proportional to the difference between the utility
from the steady state consumption plan and consumption in autarky.  A recursive
calculation shows that this function is16
fx u x u u x u
Dg g g g b () ( )() () ( ) () =- - - + - - 11 dp w d p w w 16 27 2 7 .
By exactly the same argument as that leading to Proposition 3, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 5: A symmetric stochastic steady state  x
g  of the debt constrained economy
is characterized by
f
D(/ ) w 20 ³  and x
g = w /2 or
w w
g > /2,  fx
Dg () = 0 and x
gg Î[/ , ] ww 2.
When  p =1 the function  f
D is concave and satisfies  f
Dg () w > 0, and we have
concluded that a symmetric steady state exists and is unique.  Since when 01 << p  it is
still true that  f
D is concave and satisfies  f
Dg () w > 0, we reach exactly the same
conclusions.
Proposition 6: A symmetric stochastic steady state exists in the debt constrained
economy.  There is only one symmetric stochastic steady state.
An interesting question is how the steady state level of consumption depends on
the parameter 1-p  measuring the persistence of the shock.  From the implicit function














We already observed that at an interior steady state  f
D must intersect the axis from
below, so ¶¶ fx
Dg /  is positive.  We can also rewrite  f
D as
fx u x u u x u u x u
D g gg gb gg ()( ) () () ( ) () () () =- - + - - + - 1 dw d p w w w 27 2 7 .
When  fx
Dg () = 0 , since the first term is negative, the second term is positive, and since
¶¶ p f










meaning that a more persistent shock results in greater consumption by the good
productivity consumer, or equivalently less trade between the two consumers.17
This result is reinforced by reexamination of the numerical example.   Recall that
ux x () l o g = , while the endowments and discount factors are ww
gb == 24 9 ,,   r =1,
d =12 / .  Recall that in the deterministic case, p =1, we had xx
gb == 18 16 ,.   B y  w a y
of contrast, if p =12 / , we can compute
fx x x






34 9 0 27 ,
from which it follows that  xx
gb == 2152 1248 ., . , a considerable reduction in the
amount of consumption smoothing.
In the debt constrained economy, when the economy becomes stochastic,
consumption smoothing is reduced, and consumption of x
g  and x
b fluctuates randomly.
Conceptually, however, the equilibria are very similar in the deterministic and stochastic
cases.
The case of liquidity constraints is strikingly different.  As in the deterministic
case, the good productivity consumer trades goods to the bad productivity consumer in
exchange for physical capital.  Since the good productivity consumer holds physical
capital at the end of the period, his first order condition
vD ux








() ( ) ( ) () () ++ +- + ¢ +-
=
11 1 pp w
d
continues to determine prices, where vs+1 is the price of capital when the state at t +1 is
the same as that in the previous period, and  ¢+ vs 1 is the price when a reversal of the state
takes place.  In addition, we show in the appendix (see also Levine and Zame [1996], for
example) that the capital prices vs  must be uniformly bounded, say by  v , or else no one
would be willing to hold capital.
This boundedness of physical capital prices poses a dilemma, however.  The
consumer with bad productivity must purchase x
bb -w  units of consumption each
period, and so must expend at least  (/) ( ) 1 vx
bb -w  units of physical capital each period.
Since there is only one unit of capital in the economy, a consumer can have bad
productivity no more than  vx
bb /( ) -w  periods before he will have expended all of his
physical capital.  If 01 << p , however, then there is a positive probability that a
consumer will have a run of bad luck with his productivity that exceeds this length of
time.  We conclude that x
bb -= w 0, that is, the only possible stochastic steady state is18
autarky.  In autarky, however, the consumer with bad productivity is free to borrow, so
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This is possible only if w w
gb = , violating the assumption that w w
gb > .  We can
summarize this discussion with a proposition.
Proposition 7: If 01 << p  there is no symmetric stochastic steady state with liquidity
constraints.
There is a simple intuition for this result: Suppose that a consumer has bad productivity
for the first time.  Then he should sell some of his physical capital to smooth his
consumption.  If the consumer is unlucky enough to have bad productivity in the
subsequent period, he has less physical capital and so is in a different situation than when
he had bad productivity for the first time.  Consequently, with liquidity constraints,
consumption must depend not only on the current state, but also on the distribution of
physical capital between the two types.  Notice that this proposition is not sensitive to
permitting borrowing of physical capital: any fixed debt constraint will eventually be
exceeded by a very long run of bad luck.
7.  Dynamic Analysis
The debt constrained economy is sufficiently simple that we can give a complete
analysis even without the steady state assumption. Given an arbitrary initial condition
q 0
1,  q 0
2  there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium can have two distinct phases: an
initial phase and a final phase. In the deterministic case the initial phase is just the first
period; more generally, the initial phase lasts until the two consumer types exchange
roles. The equilibrium is one of two types. If the parameters are such that the symmetric
first best satisfies the debt constraints, then in the final phase, each consumer’s
consumption over time is constant. If the symmetric first best does not satisfy the debt
constraint, then the final phase is the symmetric steady state. The striking fact in this case
is that, even if the initial condition and initial phase are quite asymmetric, once roles have
reversed, from that point on consumption depends only a consumer’s endowment, and not
on his type.19
This characterization of dynamic equilibrium formally presented in the appendix.
Recall that the first welfare theorem holds for these economies. There are two separate
cases, the non-binding case in which the debt constraint does not bind at the symmetric
first best and the binding case in which it does. In the non-binding case, efficiency
requires that consumption remain constant until the first point in time at which the debt
constraint does begin to bind. If the debt constraint never binds, then the equilibrium is a
steady state, although not necessarily a symmetric one. If the debt constraint does bind at
some point, then from that point on, the stationarity of the model forces the economy to a
steady state with constant consumption in which the debt constraints binds on just one
consumer type.
The binding case, where the debt constraint is binding at the symmetric first best,
is more interesting. Here, it is easy to show that in equilibrium the debt constraint
eventually binds on both types of consumers. When it binds for the first time, the
equilibrium jumps immediately to the symmetric steady state. The intuition is clear:
Efficiency requires that the equilibrium allocation solve the problem of maximizing the
expected discounted utility of the unconstrained type from that date onward, subject to
the individual rationality constraints for the other consumer type. If the unconstrained
type is always the type with the smaller endowment, then this problem is symmetric
between the two consumers and the equilibrium after the debt constraint binds for the first
time must be both symmetric and stationary.
The dynamic path of consumption and capital can be illustrated by our numerical
example. For simplicity we discuss the deterministic case. We first consider an example
in the non-binding case. In any such example, we should first check to see if the constant
allocation that satisfies the budget constraints also satisfies the individual rationality
constraints: if it does then this is the unique equilibrium. To do this check, we observe
that in any steady state with non-binding individual rationality constraints the price of
capital is vr =- dd /( ) 1 . Letting the first consumer type have the high endowment first,
the sequential markets budget constraints are
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We can easily solve these two equations for q1
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2 1 =+ - - + wd ww d q () / ( ) .
We then simply check that  ux ux u u
ii g b ( ) ( ) () () ++ dw d w , for  i =12 , . To make things
interesting, let us suppose that  ux x () l o g = ,  w
g = 24,  w
b = 9,   r =1,  and d = 34 / . If
q 0
2 033 < . , then x
2 1576 < . , which can easily be checked to violate the individual
rationality constraint. Take then the case in which q 0
2 0 = . Beginning at  t =1, when the
individual rationality constraint starts to bind, we nevertheless have  xt
1 1824 = .,
xt






















1 += + + qw q () .
These must be solved for  x0
1 and  v0 . Since after  t = 0 we will be at the steady state, both
consumers must hold the same capital shares going into period 1 that they will hold going
into any odd period. Using this fact, we calculate  x0
1 1927 = .,x0
2 1473 = .,v0 317 = ..
Next we examine the binding case. Suppose we lower the discount factor from
d = 34 /  to d =12 / . Then we can easily check that at the symmetric first best, the
individual rationality constraints bind. Computing the symmetric steady state, we find
that  v =129 .,q
g =- 132 .,q
b = 232 ., x
g =18, x
b =16 . In period  t = 0 we use the













to solve for  x0































With liquidity constraints the structure of equilibrium in the stochastic case is
complicated: it cannot be a stochastic steady state.  In a sense the picture is worse than
this.  Equilibria have been computed in a few special cases, as in Scheinkman and Weiss
[1986] and Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford [1992].  There is a general theorem about
existence of Markov equilibrium due to Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan
[1994], and a method of computing approximate equilibria due to Levine [1993].  The
equilibria are Markov on a very large state space, however, and as far as we know no
model that combines both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk has been successfully used for
calibration or estimation. The debt constrained economy is much simpler.  Stochastic
steady states do exist, and are easy to compute.  This is because in a stochastic steady
state short run shocks have no long run effects.22
Appendix
We treat the general case of random productivity.  The results also apply to the
special case of the deterministic model of the first half of the paper when we set the
reversal probability p =1.





++ denote the equilibrium consumption plan of type i, and let 
r
q
i  be the
corresponding plan for holding capital.  The strategy of proof is to construct, for any state
history s, an alternative consumption plan 
r
x for one of types that satisfies the budget and
liquidity constraints.  The fact that the utility from the equilibrium plan is at least as good
as that from the alternative plan gives rise to an inequality.  We can then manipulate this
inequality, using the fact that equilibrium consumption must be socially feasible, to
derive an upper bound on the capital price vs .  (Capital prices are bounded below because
they are nonnegative.)
Fix  sS Î .  One type, say i, must hold at least half the physical capital stock in
equilibrium at s.  Consider the alternative plan for type i, 
r
x, that consumes xv ss = /2 at
s,  xw
i
ss =  for state histories s > s that follow s, and xx
i
ss =  ( t h e  s a m e  a s  t h e
equilibrium plan) for all other state histories.  Since type i holds at least half of the
physical capital at s this plan satisfies the budget and liquidity constraints if we choose
capital holding qs = 0 for s ³ s and qq ss =


















x, it also satisfies the budget and liquidity
constraints if we choose capital holdings ql q l q s
l
ss =- + () 1
i .
Since at equilibrium prices 
r
x
l  is feasible for i and 
r
x
i is optimal, we must have
() ( ) () ( )
() () 11 -³ -














x differ only along the branch of the tree of state histories that begins at s
this inequality holds also where the sum on both sides is only over states the equal or
follow s.  Dividing the resulting inequality by dp
ts
s
() , we can write
() ( ) ( )() ( ) ( )
() ( ) 11 -- ³ - - -










s ux ux ux ux .23
The concavity of u implies that  Du x x x u x u x s
ii () () () ss
l
ss
l - - .  This inequality
is immediate if xx
i
ss
l £ , since then ux ux
i () () ss
l -  is nonpositive.  If xx
i
ss
l ³ , then
xx
i
ss ³  so for all  ¢ xs ,  xxx
i
sss
l ³ ¢ ³ ,Du x Du x () () ss ³ ¢  and the inequality follows from
Taylor’s theorem.  Since in addition,  xx
i
ss
l lw -£, and for s > s  x
b
s w ³ , we conclude
that
D u ux ux
bi () ()() wl w ss
l ³-.
Substituting back into the previous utility inequality, this gives





i Du u x u x
() () () ( ) ()() ³- - -
- 1
1 .
Dividing both sides by dp l
ts
s
() -1  and taking the limit as l ® 0 we find
dw w d s Du Du x x x
bi
ss
i () ( )() ³- - 1 .
Since xs
i £w  and xv ss = /2, we conclude that if vs /2³w
dw w d w w Du Du v
b























Proposition A: If  ps, xs
1, xs
2 is an equilibrium of the debt constrained economy with
Arrow-Debreu budget constraints, then there exist prices  qs and vs and asset holdings
q s
1 and  q s




2  is an equilibrium of the economy with




2  is an equilibrium
of the economy with sequential markets constraints, then there exist prices  ps such that
ps, xs
1, xs
2 is an equilibrium of the economy with Arrow-Debreu budget constraints
Proof: Consider first an equilibrium of the economy with Arrow-Debreu budget
constraints. The budget constraint is





Î Î å å () q 0
If wealth  pw r s sS s
ii
Î å + () q 0 is unbounded or if ps = 0 for some s, the consumer’s
problem has no solution, so in equilibrium neither of these can be the case. From finite24
wealth and the fact that w r s
ii +q 0  is uniformly bounded away from zero, we conclude that
the infinite price vector 
r
p  is an element of  l
1;  that is, the sequence 
r
p  is summable.
Since  ps > 0 and 
r
l p Î
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Since in equilibrium x w
ii
ssw -³ - , we also find from the definitions that
q w h (,) / s
i r ³- .
Consequently, if Q³w / r, any budget feasible plan with respect to the Arrow-Debreu
budget constraint is budget feasible with respect to the sequential markets budget
constraint.  Moreover, the consumption alternative defined in the lemma is budget
feasible with respect to the present value budget constraint, so it follows also that the n s
are uniformly bounded.
Now consider an equilibrium of the economy with sequential markets budget
constraints.  We want show that, if the prices n s are uniformly bounded, a consumption
plan that is feasible with respect to the sequential markets budget constraints is feasible
with respect to the corresponding Arrow-Debreu budget constraint.





















We now recursively work the budget constraint forward, solving the budget
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and substituting back into the previous period budget constraint
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Using the definition of present value prices, this yields a sequence of budget constraints
of the form




sS ts T ss
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sS ts T ()
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1 and in equilibrium 1+³ ³ - QQ q s
i , the final sum vanishes as T ®¥, and
the Arrow-Debreu budget constraint is satisfied.
q
Proposition B: There is a unique equilibrium of the debt constrained model. During the
initial phase, equilibrium consumption is constant. In the binding case, following the
initial phase, consumption follows the symmetric steady state. In the non-binding case,
following the initial phase equilibrium consumption is constant, although possibly
different than during the initial phase.
Proof: We first consider the binding case. Since the first welfare theorem holds, it
suffices to show that all efficient allocations have the required property. Uniqueness of
equilibrium follows directly since the values of individual consumers’ allocations at the
supporting prices are monotone in the welfare weights.
To study efficient allocation, we formulate the Pareto problem recursively as the
problem of maximizing the utility of a consumer initially in the good state subject to
social feasibility, individual rationality and a utility constraint for the other consumer.
Denote by  $ , $ UU
gb  the average present value utilities received in the good and bad state
respectively at the symmetric steady state. We denote by UU
gb ,  the average present
value utilities from the endowment in the good and bad state respectively. Note that
$ UU
gg = . It is convenient also to define the function uu ()  as the utility a consumer
receives when the other consumer receives utility u within a period. Notice that this
function is smooth, strictly concave, and that it is its own inverse.
Notice first that the average present value utility a consumer initially in the bad
state receives must be at least U
b , and, since the constraint binds on the other consumer
at the symmetric steady state, no more than  $ U
b . Let VU
gb ()  for UU U
bb b Î[, $ ] be the
solution to the problem of maximizing the utility of a consumer initially in the good state26
subject to social feasibility, individual rationality and a utility constraint for the other
consumer. The inverse of this function is denoted by VU
bg () . Exploiting the symmetry
between the two consumers, let u
b be the initial utility of the consumer in the bad state,
let  ~ U
b  be his second period average present value if he remains in the bad state, and let
~ ~
U
b  be his second period average present value if he switches to the good state. The
Bellman equation is
VU u u VU VU
gb
uUU
bg b b b
bbb ()m a x ( ) ( ) ( )( ~ )( ~ ~
)
, ~ , ~ ~ =- + - + 11 dd p d p
subject to





















The objective function is strictly concave, so this problem has a unique solution.
Consequently, it suffices to verify that our proposed plan of time constant consumption in
the initial phase, and the symmetric steady state thereafter solves this problem.
Under this proposal  ~ $ , ~ ~ $ UU UU
bb bg == , and the utility constraint should bind, so









Plugging these guesses into the Bellman equation, and observing that VU U
bg b ( $ ) $ = , we
can solve to find our proposed value function
VU





















and we may also solve for the inverse function
VU





















We need only show that the first order conditions and constraints are satisfied by our
proposed solution.
We begin by verifying the constraints hold at the proposed solution. The first
constraint holds with equality by construction. The second constraint holds because the
U
b  must be in the range [, $ ] UU
bb . The third constraint holds because the symmetric
steady state satisfies the individual rationality restrictions; indeed it holds with equality.
Turning to the fourth constraint, since u is strictly decreasing, since UU
bb £ $ , it
suffices to show that
uU U U U U U
bb g g g b $$ $ $ +
-






d 11 38 38 .
To show this, observe that at the symmetric steady state
() $ () $$ $ 11 -+ - + =
- dd p d p
hh h h uU U U ,
so that
$ $ ( $$ ) uU UU








Since  $ UU
gg =  the inequality in question reads uu u
bg ($ ) $ ³ . Since the symmetric steady
state is socially feasible, in fact uu u
bg ($ ) $ = . So the fourth inequality is verified.
Similarly for the fifth inequality, we may write it as
uU U U U U U
gg b bb g $$ $ $ +
-






d 11 38 38 .
Making use of the equations for $ u
h above and uu u
gb ($ ) $ = , this becomes
$ ( $$ ) $ UU U UU U








d 11 38 ,
which follows directly from the fact that at the symmetric steady state  $ UU
bb ³ .
To verify the first order conditions, we guess that all the Lagrange multipliers are
zero except for those corresponding to the first and third constraints. So we write the
Lagrangean
() ( ) () ( ~ )( ~ ~
)





+- + - + +
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ld d p d p m
uu V U V U
uU U U
bg b b b
bb b b 4928
The corresponding first order conditions are
l =-Du u
b () , l =-DV U
gb (
~




It suffices to show, therefore, that Du u DV U
bg b () ( ) = , and Du u DV U
bb g () ( $ ) ³ . From the
definition of VV
gb ,  above, we have
DV U Du U U U





DV U Du U U U













This gives Du u DV U
bg b () ( ) =  immediately. Substituting into the final inequality, we
must show
Du U U U Du U U U








d 11 38 38 .
Since UUU
bbg ££ $$ , this follows from the fact that Du is strictly decreasing.
Turning to the non-binding case, observe that when the utility constraints do not
bind, the unique efficient allocation is for each consumer to have a constant consumption
stream in all periods. If we increase the utility of the consumer initially in the bad state,
eventually the constraint binds on the consumer in the good state. Since this is an efficient
allocation, the consumer initially in the bad state can receives no higher utility in any
feasible allocation satisfying the utility constraints.
In the opposite case, where we reduce the utility of the consumer initially in the
bad state, eventually the constraint binds on that consumer in the first period following
the initial phase. To reduce his utility further, we simply reduce his consumption in the
initial phase only, leaving the constraint after the initial phase just binding. It is easy to
show that efficiency demands a constant consumption stream during the initial phase, and
this allocation can easily be verified to be efficient using exactly the same type of
dynamic programming argument used above.
q29
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